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1 Introduction
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that, when a social choice
function is dened on the universal set of preference proles over k alterna-
tives (k > 2), and its range contains at least three alternatives, it can only
be strategy-proof if it is dictatorial.
This result is subject to di¤erent qualications. One is that, when the
rule is dened on smaller sets of proles, there may or may not exist other
rules that are strategy-proof, in addition to the dictatorial ones. This is the
case under a variety of domains, that include the ones formed by the Carte-
sian product of single-peaked preferences, or of single-dipped preferences, or
of separable preferences, among others. Our statements in this paper will be
essentially true for functions dened on any domain, however small, asym-
metric or special it may be.1
A second qualication concerns the range of the social choice function.
In this paper we consider the subclass of functions that fail to meet Gibbard
and Satterthwaites requirement that their range should contain at least three
alternatives. Specically, we concentrate on rules that are not constant and
whose range consists of exactly two alternatives, x and y. Because of this,
it is known that in that case there are possibilities to design non-dictatorial
strategy-proof rules. We want to characterize them all. This leads us to
notice that the range of a social choice function may be binary because
there are only two alternatives in the relevant world, but it may also be
binary in the presence of more than two alternatives, in which case this may
be considered as one part of the possible choices open to the mechanism
designer. As we shall see, the characterization of binary rules in this context
requires a number of precisions and careful treatment that can be avoided in
worlds where only two alternatives are present to begin with.
A third qualication refers to the notion of strategy-proofness to be used.
When we concentrate on rules with binary ranges, there exist a number of
attractive strategy-proof rules, and it becomes then much more interesting
to explore the extent to which some of them may also be immune to ma-
nipulation by groups. We analyze this question carefully, under a number of
di¤erent possible notions of group strategy-proofness, and also by keeping in
mind that we want our statements to hold for functions dened on any type
1By "essentially true" we mean that they are either true without qualication, or true
under very minor assumptions, to be discussed case by case.
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of domains.
One denition of group strategy-proofness requires that it should not be
possible for a group of agents to deviate from declaring their true preferences
and get a strict gain for each one of them. Social choice functions avoiding
this strong type of manipulation are called Weakly Group Strategy-Proof. A
second denition starts from considering that a group can protably devi-
ate if some of its members derive a strict gain from doing so, while others
simply remain indi¤erent while helping their partners. Rules that avoid this
weaker form of manipulation are called Strongly Group Strategy-Proof. In
an intermediate version of the property, that we simply call Group Strategy-
Proofness, we allow that only some agents may gain from the deviation,
but we require that all agents involved in getting the change should actively
participate in the manipulation by actually deviating from their truthful pref-
erence. We provide characterizations of the classes of social choice functions
that satisfy each one of these three properties, and also we elaborate on why
we single out these particular denitions.
Our main characterization results identify two types of basic properties
that these rules must satisfy. These properties must be qualied in each
case. Since we allow individuals to be indi¤erent between x and y, in some
cases we will require that they are satised "essentially", and in other cases
not. By "essentially" we mean that the properties will hold conditional to
the fact that the preferences of individuals that are indi¤erent between the
two alternatives in the range remain constant. Our rst condition is that
of essential xy-monotonicity: if x obtains at a prole, and then some people
change their preferences so that the support for x increases, while the support
for y does not, then x must still obtain at the new prole. A more demanding
requirement in a similar spirit is that of xy-strong monotonicity. In that case
if x obtains at a prole, and preference changes induce larger support for x;
then x still be chosen at the new prole even if support for y may have also
increased.2 A second type of requirement refers to the type of information on
which our rules may be based. We say that they are xy-based if what they
choose at each preference prole only depends on the relative position of x
with respect to y for each individual. It is essentially xy-based if the property
holds when we only compare proles where individuals indi¤erent between
2In this second denition we drop the qualication for the property being essential
because the statement is no longer conditioned to the preferences of indi¤erent individuals
remaining constant.
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x and y keep their preferences unchanged. Notice also that the requirement
will not apply in the case where all individuals are indi¤erent between both
alternatives in the range.
We establish three characterization results in terms of the above condi-
tions, one for each of our three types of group strategy-proofness require-
ments. A social choice function is weakly group strategy-proof if and only if
it is essentially xy-based and essentially xy-monotonic. It is strongly group
strategy-proof if and only if it is xy-based and xy-strong monotonic. Finally,
we show that, when n  3 and under a mild condition on the richness of the
domain, rules that meet our intermediate notion of group strategy-proofness
are also strongly group strategy-proof, and thus satisfy the same properties.
The sophisticated reader will realize that our conditions are part of a large
set of di¤erent requirements that have been used by di¤erent authors under
di¤erent names for the characterization of strategy-proof rules over universal
domains. Names like Maskin monotonicity, strong positive association, and
others have been used to denote variations of properties that one expects to
be satised by rules that are strategy-proof. And, indeed, many combinations
of properties end up characterizing the same rules when these are dened on
rich enough domains. We feel that our choice of properties is especially t,
because they allow us to characterize rules dened on all kinds of domains,
possibly very asymmetric and containing few preferences. The equivalence
between ours and other properties is not granted under these circumstances.
Also notice that we do not insist on individual strategy-proofness as a special
case to characterize. This is because by a recent result of ours, it is an estab-
lished fact that individual and weak group strategy-proofness are equivalent
when the range of the social choice function consists of only two (or three)
elements (see Barberà, Berga, and Moreno, 2010).
A di¤erent type of characterization results are based on descriptions of
how the rules would choose alternatives at each preference prole. There
exist two relevant papers that take this point of view. One is by Larsson
and Svensson (2006), who provide a characterization of strategy-proof rules:
under our assumption that the range is binary, strategy-proofness is equiv-
alent to weak group strategy-proofness, as proven in Barberà, Berga, and
Moreno (2010). Hence, their characterization in terms of the functional form
provides an alternative to the one we present here. A second result, this one
due to Manjunath (2009a), characterizes the functional form of strong group
strategy-proof rules when there are only two alternatives. We re-state the
result with some additional precisions and in order to cover the case where
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the range is binary but preferences are dened on a larger set of alternatives,
and provide a novel proof for it.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the framework,
we present di¤erent versions of group strategy-proofness and discuss their
relationships under di¤erent domain assumptions. In Section 3 we provide
the characterizations in terms of properties. In Section 4 we provide the
announced additional characterization of strongly group strategy-proof rules,
the novel proof, that also allows us to complete the proof of one of the
theorems in the preceding section. Section 5 concludes.
2 The setup and denitions
Let A be a nite set of alternatives A = fx; y; z; w:::g: Let N be a nite set
of agents N = f1; 2; :::; ng: Let U be the set of all preorders on A (complete,
reexive, and transitive binary relations on A). Let Ri  U be the set of
admissible preferences for agent i 2 N and let R i2N Ri.
For any preference relation Ri 2 Ri, we denote by Pi and Ii the strict
and indi¤erence part of Ri, respectively. A preference prole is denoted by
R = (R1; ::; Rn) 2 R or also by R = (RC ; R C) 2 R when we want to stress
the role of a coalition C  N . Then RC 2 RC i2C Ri and R C 2 RNnC
denote the preferences of agents in C and in NnC, respectively.
A social choice function (or rule) on a domain R is a function f : R! A.
The range of f is denoted by Af . In this paper we concentrate on the family
of social choice functions with binary range, that is, whose range consists of
exactly two elements, that we call x and y from now on.
Let Rxi j Ri be the subset of preferences such that for any Rxi 2 Rxi ,
xP xi y. Similarly, dene Ryi . Let Rxyi j Ri be the subset of preferences such
that for any Rxyi 2 Rxyi , xIxyi y.
We state our results under the following minimal assumption on the
domain of admissible preferences: each individual has at least one admissi-
ble preference where x is preferred to y, one where y is preferred to x; and
one where he is indi¤erent between the two. That is, for any i 2 N and any
t 2 fx; y; xyg, Rti 6= ?.3
3For several of our results, we could even weaken this minimal condition on the domain
and allow for some of the sets Rti to be empty.
4
The best known nonmanipulability axiom is strategy-proofness. It re-
quires the truth to be a dominant strategy and it is a necessary condition
for implementation in dominant strategies (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite,
1975).
Denition 1 An agent i 2 N can manipulate a social choice function f on
R at R 2 R if there exists R0i 2 Ri such that Ri 6= R0i and f(R0i; R i)Pif(R).
A social choice function f is strategy-proof on R if no agent i 2 N can
manipulate f on R.
Another form of manipulation is by means of coalitions. The following
denitions refer to cases where agents may gain from joint changes of de-
clared preferences. They di¤er on two accounts: the required gains from
manipulation and the actions expected from coalition members. Regarding
gains from manipulation we may require that each member from deviating
coalitions obtains a strict gain or else that only some of them do with the
rest not losing. Regarding deviations we may ask that all members of a coali-
tion misrepresent their preferences or that just some of them do. The three
denitions below will reect these modelling choices.4
Denition 2 A coalition C can strongly manipulate a social choice function
f on R at R 2 R if there exists R0C 2 RC such that for all agent i 2 C,
Ri 6= R0i and f(R0C ; R C)Pif(R). A social choice function f is weakly group
strategy-proof on R if no coalition C  N can strongly manipulate f on
R.
Denition 3 A coalition C can manipulate a social choice function f on R
at R 2 R if there exists R0C 2 RC such that for all agent i 2 C, Ri 6= R0i
and f(R0C ; R C)Rif(R), and for some j 2 C, f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R). A social
choice function f is group strategy-proof on R if no coalition C  N can
manipulate f on R.
Denition 4 A coalition C can weakly manipulate a social choice function
f on R at R 2 R if there exists R0C 2 RC such that for some agent l 2 C,
4We shall omit what could have been a fourth version of group strategy-proofness, one
that would require all agents to gain but would allow for some of them not to change their
preferences. That would turn out to be equivalent to weak group strategy-proofness (see
Denition 2).
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Rl 6= R0l, for all agent i 2 C, f(R0C ; R C)Rif(R), and for some j 2 C,
f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R). A social choice function f is strongly group strategy-
proof on R if no coalition C  N can weakly manipulate f on R.
Remarks (1) Strategy-proofness and weak group strategy-proofness are
equivalent for social choice functions with binary range (see Proposition 1
and Theorem 1 in Barberà, Berga, and Moreno, 2010).
(2) When indi¤erences are not allowed, all three denitions of group strategy-
proofness collapse in a single one.
(3) Strong group strategy-proofness implies group strategy-proofness and the
latter implies weak group strategy-proofness. The converse implications do
not hold in general, as shown by the following examples.
Example 1 A rule that is group strategy-proof but not strongly. Let n  2
and #A  2, x; y 2 A. Then, for any R 2 UN , dene the social choice
function f as follows:
f(R) =

x if xPiy for any i 2 N ,
y otherwise.
We show that f is not strongly group strategy-proof. Let R be such that each
agent strictly prefers x to y and let R0 be such that n 1 agents strictly prefer
x over y, and the other agent is indi¤erent between x and y. Observe that
f(R) = x and f(R0) = y: Then, coalition N could weakly manipulate f at R0
via R. The reader may check that the rule satises the two weaker strategic
conditions.
Example 2 A rule that is weakly group strategy-proof but not group. Let
n  2, #A  2 and agentspreferences such that for any i 2 N , Rti 6= ?
for any t 2 fx; y; xyg. Let k be a dictator on fx; yg, that is, f(R) = x when
Rk 2 Rxk [Rxyk and f(R) = y otherwise.
Note that f is (weakly group) strategy-proof. However, coalition C = fk; jg
j 6= k could manipulate f at (Rxyk ; Ryj ; R fj;kg) via (Ryk; R0j; R fj;kg) for any
R0j 2 Rxi [ Rxyi and any R fj;kg 2 RNnfj;kg. Thus, f is not group strategy-
proof (thus not strongly).
Before characterizing the rules that satisfy our di¤erent requirements, let
us remark that group strategy-proofness and strong group strategy-proofness
become equivalent under the mild complementary domain condition re-
quired in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 Let #A  3 and R be such that each individual has at least
two admissible preferences in Ri where x is preferred to y and two where y
is preferred to x: Then, any group strategy-proof social choice function f on
R with a binary range is also strongly group strategy-proof.
Proof. Let f be a group strategy-proof social choice function. Suppose that
f is not strongly group strategy-proof. That is, there exist R 2 R, a coalition
C  N , and R0C 2 RC such that for some agent l 2 C, Rl 6= R0l, for all agents
i 2 C; f(R0C ; R C)Rif(R), and for some j 2 C, f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R). If for
any agent l 2 C, Rl 6= R0l, then we get a contradiction to group strategy-
proofness.
Thus, there exist l 2 C such that Rl = R0l: Dene CP = fj 2 C : Rj = R0j and
f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R)g and CI = fk 2 C : Rk = R0k and f(R0C ; R C)Ikf(R)g.
By the complementary domain condition, for any j 2 CP , there exists R00j 2
RjnRj such that f(R0C ; R C)P 00j f(R). If f(R00CP ; R0CnCP ; R C) = f(R) there
exist a coalition CP , a prole (R00CP ; R
0
CnCP ; R C) 2 R, and R0CP = RCP such
that for any agent j 2 CP R00j 6= Rj and f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R00CP ; R0CnCP ; R C) =
f(R) which is a contradiction to group strategy-proofness.
Thus, f(R00CP ; R
0
CnCP ; R C) = f(R
0
C ; R C):
If CI = ? then observe that there exist R 2 R, a coalition C  N , and
R00C  (R00CP ; R0CnCP ) 2 RC such that for any agent i 2 C, Ri 6= R00i and
f(R00CP ; R
0
CnCP ; R C)Rif(R), and for some j 2 C, f(R00CP ; R0CnCP ; R C)Pjf(R).
Then we get a contradiction to group strategy-proofness.
Thus, CI 6= ?. By the complementary domain condition, for any k 2
CI , there exists R00k 2 RknRk such that f(R00CP ; R0CnCP ; R C)P 00k f(R). If
f(R00CP[CI ; R
0
Cn(CP[CI); R C) = f(R) coalition CI could manipulate f via RCI
at (R00CP[CI ; R
0
Cn(CP[CI); R C), which contradicts group strategy-proofness.
Thus, f(R00CP[CI ; R
0
Cn(CP[CI); R C) = f(R
0
C ; R C). Then observe that there
exist R 2 R, a coalition C  N , and R000C  (R00CP[CI ; R0Cn(CP[CI)) 2 RC such
that for any agent i 2 C, Ri 6= R000i and f(R00CP[CI ; R0Cn(CP[CI); R C)Rif(R),
and for some j 2 C, f(R00CP[CI ; R0Cn(CP[CI); R C)Pjf(R), and then we get a
contradiction to group strategy-proofness.
Remark 1 We have assumed in Proposition 1 that #A  3: This is because
the complementary domain condition that we assume in our statement can
only be satised in this case. When #A = 2, this condition cannot be satised
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and in fact the equivalence does not hold (the rule in Example 1 when #A = 2
provides a counterexample).
3 Characterization results: properties
In this section we provide our rst set of characterization results. We prove
that our di¤erent versions of the condition that a rule should be xy-based
and monotonic are necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee that they satisfy our
di¤erent versions of group strategy-proofness.5
For each preference prole R 2 R; dene the set X(R) = fi 2 N : xPiyg;
Y (R) = fj 2 N : yPjxg, and I(R) = fk 2 N : yIkxg.
We now dene the conditions that will characterize weak and strong group
strategy-proofness.
Denition 5 A binary social choice function is essentially xy-monotonic6
if and only if for any R;R0 2 R such that Rh = R0h for all h 2 I(R) \ I(R0);
the following holds:
[X(R0)  X(R); Y (R)  Y (R0) (at least one strict inclusion), and f(R) = x]
) f(R0) = x; and
[Y (R0)  Y (R); X(R)  X(R0) (at least one strict inclusion), and f(R) = y]
) f(R0) = y:
Denition 6 A binary social choice function is xy-strongly monotonic if
and only if for any R;R0 2 R the following holds:
[if eitherX(R0)  X(R); Y (R)  Y (R0) (at least one strict inclusion), or
X(R0)  X(R), ? 6= Y (R) $ Y (R0)] and f(R) = x) f(R0) = x;
[if either Y (R0)  Y (R); X(R)  X(R0) (at least one strict inclusion), or
Y (R0)  Y (R), ? 6= X(R) $ X(R0)] and f(R) = y ) f(R0) = y.
5Examples showing the relationship between the properties dened in this section are
available upon request.
6Lemma 7 in Manjunath (2009b) shows that when the set of admissible preferences is
the set of all single-dipped preferences and a specic binary range restriction, some version
of essentially xy-monotonicity is a consequence of strategy-proofness.
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Observe that xy-strong monotonicity implies essential xy-monotonicity
but the converse does not hold. Moreover, both concepts coincide if indi¤er-
ences are not allowed.
Denition 7 A social choice function is essentially xy-based7 if and only
if for all R;R0 2 R such that Rh = R0h for h 2 I(R)
[X(R) = X(R0) and Y (R) = Y (R0)]) f(R) = f(R0).
Denition 8 A social choice function is xy-based if and only if for all
R;R0 2 R such that X(R) [ Y (R) 6= ?,
[X(R) = X(R0) and Y (R) = Y (R0)]) f(R) = f(R0).
Observe that if a rule is xy-based it is also essentially xy-based but that
the converse does not hold. Again, both concepts coincide if indi¤erences are
not allowed. Moreover, both concepts trivially hold if for any agent i 2 N ,
#Rxi 6 1, #Ryi 6 1, and #Rxyi 6 1, in particular when #A = 2 they always
coincide.
Next, we state our two characterization results using the above proper-
ties.8
Theorem 1 A social choice function f on R with binary range is strategy-
proof, thus also weakly group strategy-proof, if and only if f is essentially
xy-based and essentially xy-monotonic.
Proof. (() Let f be a social choice function with binary range that is es-
sentially xy-based and essentially xy-monotonic. By contradiction, suppose
that agent i can manipulate f at R via R0i; that is, f(R
0
i; R i)Pif(R); where
without loss of generality f(R) = x and f(R0i; R i) = y: Thus, i 2 Y (R).
If i 2 Y (R0i; R i); since f is essentially xy-based we obtain that f(R) =
f(R0i; R i). If i 2 NnY (R0i; R i) by essential xy-monotonicity of f we get
7Lemma 6 in Manjunath (2009b) shows that when the set of admissible preferences is
the set of all single-dipped preferences and a specic binary range restriction, essentially
xy-basedness is a consequence of strategy-proofness.
8Examples showing the independence of the properties required to characterize the two
di¤erent versions of non-manipulability by groups (essentially xy-based and essentially
xy-monotonicity on the one hand and xy-based and xy-strong monotonicity on the other
hand) are available upon request.
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that f(R0i; R i) = f(R): Thus, we obtain the desired contradiction.
()) Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function with binary range. First,
we prove by contradiction that f is essentially xy-based. Suppose not. Let
R;R0 2 R such that X(R) = X(R0); Y (R) = Y (R0); Rh = R0h for any
h 2 I(R); f(R) = x; and f(R0) = y: Let S be the set of agents i 2 N chang-
ing their preferences when going from Ri to R0i: Note that S  X(R)[Y (R):
Without loss of generality, suppose that S is a singleton k:9 Thus, f(R) = x
and f(R0k; R k) = y: If k 2 X(R) = X(R0); agent k could manipulate f at
R0 via Rk: If k 2 Y (R) = Y (R0); agent k could manipulate f at R via R0k:
This is the desired contradiction.
Now we prove that f is essentially xy-monotonic. Suppose not, that is,
there exist R;R0 2 R such that Rh = R0h for all h 2 I(R) \ I(R0), either
X(R0)  X(R); Y (R)  Y (R0) (with one inequality strict), f(R) = x, and
f(R0) = y; or else Y (R0)  Y (R); X(R)  X(R0) (with one inequality strict),
f(R) = y, and f(R0) = x. We analyze the former case since the latter is sym-
metric and similar arguments apply.
Consider the set S of agents i 2 N who change preferences over x and y
when going from Ri to R0i: Any agent j 2 S is such that one of the following
cases holds: (1) j 2 Y (R) and j 2 I(R0); (2) j 2 Y (R) and j 2 X(R0); or
(3) j 2 X(R) and j 2 X(R0): That is, S can be partitioned into three sets
of agents, say S1; S2; and S3; satisfying cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Start from prole R and change preferences of all agents j 2 S one by one
from Rj to R0j.
Let j 2 S1: Then, f(R0j; R j) = x (otherwise, agent j could manipulate f
at R via R0j). Repeating the same argument for any j 2 S1 we obtain that
f(R0S1 ; R S1) = x:
Let j 2 S2: Then, f(R0S1 ; R0j; RNnfS1[jg) = x (otherwise, agent j could ma-
9If S is not a singleton, observe rst that by denition of S, f(RS ; R0 S) =
f(RS ; R S) = x: Now, depart from R and rst change one by one preferences of agents
in X(R) \ S. Then, either f(R0X(R)\S ; RSnfX(R)\Sg; R0 S) = x or at some step, after
changing the preference of some agent k 2 X(R) \ S we would go from x to y: That is,
f(R0f1;:::;(k 1)g; Rk; RSnf1;:::;kg; R
0
 S) = x and f(R
0
f1;:::;kg; RSnf1;:::;kg; R
0
 S) = y: Then, we
obtain a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Thus, f(R0X(R)\S ; RSnfX(R)\Sg; R
0
 S) =
x. Second, change one by one preferences of agents in Y (R) \ S: Similarly, either
f(R0[X(R)[Y (R)]\S ; RSnf[X(R)[Y (R)]\Sg; R
0
 S) = x or at some step after changing the pref-
erence of some agent l 2 Y (R) \ S we would go from x to y; and we would also obtain a
contradiction to strategy-proofness. Thus, f(R0S ; R
0
 S) = x which is the desired contra-
diction.
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nipulate f at (R0S1 ; R S1) via R
0
j). By repeating the same argument for any
j 2 S2 we obtain that f(R0S1[S2 ; R NnfS1[S2g) = x:
Let j 2 S3: Then, f(R0S1[S2 ; R0j; RNnfS1[S2[jg) = x (otherwise, agent j could
manipulate f at (R0S1[S2 ; R
0
j; RNnfS1[S2[jg) via Rj). By repeating the same
argument for any j 2 S3 we obtain that f(R0S; R NnS) = x.
Consider the set T = NnS that do not change preferences over x and y
when going from Ri to R0i; but may change their rankings of other alterna-
tives. Any agent t 2 T is such that one of the following cases holds: (1)
t 2 X(R) \ X(R0); (2) t 2 Y (R) \ Y (R0). Thus, T can be partitioned into
two sets, say T1 and T2.
Start from prole R and change the preferences of all agents t 2 T one by
one from Rt to R0t:
Let t 2 T1: Then, f(R0S; R0t; RTnftg) = x (otherwise, agent j could manipulate
f at (R0S; R
0
t; RTnftg) via Rt). By repeating the same argument for any t 2 T1
we obtain that f(R0S; R
0
T1
; RTnT1) = x:
Let t 2 T2: Then, f(R0S[T1 ; R0t; RTnfT1[tg) = x (otherwise, agent j can manip-
ulate f at (R0S[T1 ; RTnT1) via R
0
t). By repeating the same argument for any
t 2 T2 we obtain that f(R0) = x which is the desired contradiction.
Our second characterization result has similar avour than that of Theo-
rem 1. It establishes the equivalence of strong group strategy-proofness with
two conditions, one of monotonicity and the other requiring the rule to be
range based.
Theorem 2 Let f be a social choice function on R with a binary range.
Then f is strongly group strategy-proof if and only if f is xy-based and xy-
strong monotonic.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 2. It will be provided jointly with
that of Theorems 3 and 4.
4 Characterization results: functional forms
In this Section we provide a second characterization result for strongly group
strategy-proof rules. Manjunath (2009a) has already presented essentially
the same result for the two-alternative case. We slightly reformulate it here
in order to include some additional precisions for the two-agent case, and
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to cover the case where preferences are dened on more than two alterna-
tives. We also provide a di¤erent proof than Manjunaths, and use it as an
important piece to establish Theorem 2 in the preceding Section.
The functional form of all strongly group strategy-proof social choice
functions is slightly more exible when n = 2 than when n  3. Let us rst
dene two relevant classes of social choice functions: serial dictators and veto
rules.
Denition 9 Let 1  2  :::  n be an ordering of agents. Then, a serial
dictator with order ; say f, is dened as follows: f(R) = x if R 2 R
is such that either xP1y, or xI1y and xP2y, or xIiy; i = 1; 2 and xP3y; or
so on and so forth if X(R) 6= ?; f(R) = y if R 2 R is such that either
yP1x, or xI1y and yP2x, or xIiy; i = 1; 2 and yP3x; or so on and so forth
if Y (R) 6= ?. The values of the function for proles where I(R) = N (that
is, where all agents are indi¤erent between x and y) may vary from prole to
prole.
The following example shows that for n  3 the serial dictators are not
group strategy-proof, thus neither strongly. However, observe that they are
always (weakly group) strategy-proof.
Example 3 Let n  3 and let f be a serial dictator with order 1  2  ::: 
n. Let R 2 R such that xI1y, xP2y, yP3x, and other agents have preference
R f1;2;3g, R f1;2;3g 2 RNnf1;2;3g. Let R0 2 R such that yP 01x, xP 02y, yP 03x;
where R03 6= R3 and for any j =2 f1; 3g; R0j = Rj. Observe that f(R) = x
and f(R0) = y, and then coalition f1; 3g could manipulate f at R via R0f1;3g.
Thus, f is not group strategy-proof.
Denition 10 A veto rule for y is dened as follows:
f(R) =

x for any R 2 R such that xPiy for some i 2 N
y for any R 2 R such that yRix for any i 2 N and yPjx for some j 2 N
The values of the function for proles where I(R) = N (that is, where all
agents are indi¤erent) may vary from prole to prole.
A veto rule for x is dened symmetrically exchanging x by y, and viceversa.
The following concept and lemmata will be useful in the proof of our
results below.
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Lemma 1 Let n  2. Any strongly group strategy-proof social choice func-
tion f on R with binary range is xy-Paretian.10
Proof. Suppose rst that f is not xy-Paretian. That is, suppose that there
exists R 2 R such that xRiy for any i 2 N and xPjy for some j 2 N and
f(R) = y (a similar contradiction would be obtained exchanging the roles
of x and y). Then, N could weakly manipulate f at R via R0 for any R0
such that f(R0) = x, which exists since x is the range. This is the desired
contradiction.
Denition 11 Let f be a social choice function on R with binary range.
We say that an agent i 2 N is xy-pivotal for a prole R 2 R if there exists
R0i 2 Ri such that f(R0i; R i) 6= f(R).
Lemma 2 Let n  3 and f be a social choice function on R with binary
range. Let R 2 R be such that X(R) 6= ?, Y (R) 6= ?, and there is an agent
i 2 N that is xy-pivotal for R such that xIiy. Then, f is not strongly group
strategy-proof.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that f(R) = x. Note that by
assumption there exists an agent i that is xy-pivotal for R and such that
xIiy. Then, let C = fig[ Y (R). Observe that C could weakly manipulate f
at R via R0C = (R
0
i; RCnfig).
Theorem 3 For n  3, veto rules for x or y are the unique strongly group
strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges.
For n = 2, veto rules for x or y and serial dictators with any order of
agents are the unique strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions
with binary ranges.
Remark 2 The veto rules have already been described by Manjunath (2009a).
Our main additions are, on the one hand, that we propose a di¤erent proof.
And, on the other hand, the fact that we consider its extension to the case
where there are more than two alternatives, but the range is binary. Notice
that in this larger context the rule could choose di¤erent alternatives in dif-
ferent proles where all agents are indi¤erent between x and y. Also notice
that even dictatorships fail to be strongly group strategy-proof when n  2 but
when n = 2 serial dictatorships can also be strongly group strategy-proof.
10Note that this result can be generalized for rules with any range size.
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Our proof of Theorems 2 and 3 will also imply a third result that we now
state.
Theorem 4 For n  3, veto rules for x or y are the unique xy-based and
xy-strong monotonic social choice functions with binary ranges.
For n = 2, veto rules for x or y and serial dictators with any order of agents
are the unique xy-based and xy-strong monotonic social choice functions with
binary ranges.
We now proceed to the joint proof of Theorems 2, 3, and 4. Our strategy
is to show one of the directions in each of the three. Specically, we start
by proving that veto rules (and eventually serial dictatorships when n =
2) are strongly group strategy-proof (Step 1). Then, that strongly group
strategy-proof rules must be xy-based and xy-strong monotonic (Step 2),
and nally that rules satisfying these properties must have the functional
forms we started with (Step 3).
We now present the formal proof.
Proof of Theorems 2, 3, and 4.
Step 1 We rst show that, for n  2, any veto rule is strongly group
strategy-proof and that for n = 2, any serial dictatorship is also strongly
group strategy-proof.
Proof of Step 1:
By contradiction, let f be a veto rule for x (a similar argument would follow
if f was a veto rule for y) that is not strongly group strategy-proof. That
is, there exist R 2 R, C  N , and R0C 2 RC such that for some agent
l 2 C, Rl 6= R0l, for all agent i 2 C, f(R0C ; R C)Rif(R), and for some j 2 C,
f(R0C ; R C)Pjf(R). Clearly, f(R
0
C ; R C) 6= f(R). By denition of f as a
veto rule for x, f(R0C ; R C) = x and f(R) = y (otherwise, if f(R
0
C ; R C) = y
and f(R) = x, since for some agent j 2 C, yPjx, then by denition of a
veto rule for x, f(R) = y which is a contradiction). In order that f(R) = y
there must exist j 2 NnC such that yPjx. Since R0j = Rj for any j 2 NnC;
f(R0C ; R C) = y which is the desired contradiction. Thus, a veto rule is
strongly group strategy-proof.
Next, we show that, for n = 2, any serial dictatorship is strongly group
strategy-proof. By strategy-proofness no individual deviation is benecial:
only two agentsdeviations might exist. Notice that the rst agent in the
order will never participate in a deviating coalition unless he is indi¤erent
14
between x and y. But then the second agent obtains his best outcome.
This ends the proof of Step 1.
Step 2 Any strongly group strategy-proof social choice function f with
binary range is xy-based and xy-strong monotonic.
Proof of Step 2:
By Theorem 1, we know that f is essentially xy-based and essentially xy-
monotonic.
We now prove by contradiction that f is xy-based. Suppose not, then there
exist R;R0 2 R such that X(R)[Y (R) 6= ?, X(R) = X(R0); Y (R) = Y (R0),
f(R) 6= f(R0). Suppose rst that X(R) = ? and thus Y (R) 6= ? (a similar
argument applies if Y (R) = ?). By Lemma 1, f(R) = f(R0) = y which is a
contradiction. Thus, X(R) 6= ? and Y (R) 6= ?.
By essentially xy-based, f(R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)) = f(R).
If n = 2, R0 = (R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)) and we get the desired contradiction since
f(R0) must be di¤erent from f(R).
If n  3, since f(R) 6= f(R0) there must exist an agent i 2 N such that xIiy
that is xy-pivotal for (R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)). By Lemma 2, f is not strongly
group strategy-proof which is a contradiction.
We now prove by contradiction that f is xy-strong monotonic. Suppose
not, that is there exist R;R0 2 R such that either (1) X(R0)  X(R),
Y (R)  Y (R0) (at least one inclusion strict), f(R) = x but f(R0) = y; or
else (2) X(R0)  X(R), ? 6= Y (R) $ Y (R0); f(R) = x and f(R0) = y. A
similar argument holds for the other possibility where the roles of x and y
are exchanged. First observe that by Lemma 1, X(R) 6= ? and Y (R) 6= ?
(otherwise, if Y (R) = ?, then Y (R0) = ? and X(R0) % X(R). By Lemma 1,
f(R0) = x which is the desired contradiction. If X(R) = ? and Y (R) 6= ?,
then by Lemma 1 f(R) = y which is the desired contradiction).
If case (1) holds, by essential xy-monotonicity and essential xy-basedness,
f(R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)) = x (dene R
00 = (R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)), if either X(R
00) %
X(R) and Y (R00) $ Y (R) or X(R00) = X(R) and Y (R00) $ Y (R) we apply
essential xy-monotonicity. If X(R00) = X(R) and Y (R00) = Y (R) we apply
essential xy-basedness).
If n = 2, R0 = (R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)) and we get the desired contradiction since
f(R0) must be di¤erent from f(R).
If n  3, since f(R) 6= f(R0) there must exist an agent i 2 N such that xIiy
that is xy-pivotal for (R0X(R)[Y (R); RI(R)). By Lemma 2, f is not strongly
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group strategy-proof which is a contradiction.
If case (2) holds, by essential xy-monotonicity and essential xy-basedness,
f(R0X(R0); RNnX(R0)) = x (if X(R
0) % X(R), that is, X(R0) includes some
agents in I(R), we apply essential xy-monotonicity. If X(R0) = X(R) we
apply essential xy-basedness). Then, f(R0X(R0); R
0
Y (R); RNnfX(R0)[Y (R)g) = x
by essential xy-basedness.
If n = 2, R0 = (R0X(R0); R
0
Y (R); RNnfX(R0)[Y (R)g) and we get the desired con-
tradiction since f(R0) must be di¤erent from f(R).
If n  3, since f(R) 6= f(R0) there must exist an agent i 2 N that is xy-
pivotal agent for (R0X(R0); R
0
Y (R); RNnfX(R0)[Y (R)g) such that xIiy. By Lemma
2, f is not strongly group strategy-proof which is a contradiction.
This ends the proof of Step 2.
Step 3 Any xy-based and xy-strong monotonic social choice function f
with binary range can be described as a veto rule when n  3: When n = 2,
f is either a veto rule or a serial dictator.
To show Step 3, we use the following claims.
Observe rst that since f is xy-based then for any Rti, R
t
i 2 Rti, f(Rti; R i) =
f(R
t
i; R i) for any R i 2 RNnfig where t 2 fx; y; xyg.
In what follows, when we use Rti we refer to any R
t
i 2 Rti without loss of
generality. This is because all the statements we make in this proof from
now on hold whatever the representative of the set Rti is.
Claim 1 Let n  2. If f is xy-based and xy-strong monotonic then f is
xy-Paretian.
Proof of Claim 1 Let Rx 2 i2NRxi , that is, X(Rx) = N . Suppose to
get a contradiction that f(Rx) = y. Note that by xy-based and xy-strong
monotonicity, for any other prole R 2 R, f(R) = y which contradicts that
f has a binary range. Thus, f(Rx) = x.
Suppose that there is R such that xRiy for any i 2 N and xPjy for some
j 2 N; X(R) 6= N and f(R) = y. Then X(R) 6= ? and Y (R) = ?. Note
that X(R) $ X(Rx) and Y (R) = Y (Rx), for any Rx 2 i2NRxi . By xy-
strong monotonicity, f(Rx) = y which contradicts what we have just proved.
This ends the proof of Claim 1.
Note that the counterpart results to Claims 2 and 3 below exchanging the
roles of x and y do also hold.
Claim 2 Let n  2. If for some i 2 N and some Ryi 2 Ryi ; f(Ryi ; Rx i) = y,
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then f(Ryi ; R
0
 i) = y for any R
0
 i 2 RNnfig:
Proof of Claim 2 Let R0 i 2 RNnfig. Observe that f(Ryi ; R0 i) = y either
by xy-based if X(Ryi ; R
0
 i) = Nnfig = X(Ryi ; Rx i), or else by xy-strong
monotonicity if X(Ryi ; R
0
 i) $ Nnfig = X(Ryi ; Rx i). This ends the proof of
Claim 2.
Claim 3 Let n  3. If for some i 2 N and some Ryi 2 Ryi ; f(Ryi ; Rx i) = y,
then for any j 2 N we have that f(Ryj ; Rx j) = y.
Proof of Claim 3 By contradiction, suppose that f(Ryi ; R
x
 i) = y and
f(Ryj ; R
x
 j) = x. If f(R
xy
i ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) = y then f(R
y
j ; R
x
 j) = y by xy-strong
monotonicity since? 6= X(Rxyi ; Ryj ; Rx fi;jg) $ X(Ryj ; Rx j) and Y (Rxyi ; Ryj ; Rx fi;jg) =
Y (Ryj ; R
x
 j). Thus, f(R
xy
i ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) = x. By xy-strong monotonicity,
f(Ryi ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) = x, since X(R
xy
i ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) = X(R
y
i ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) and
? 6= Y (Rxyi ; Ryj ; Rx fi;jg) $ Y (Ryi ; Ryj ; Rx fi;jg). By Claim 2, since f(Ryi ; Rx i) =
y then f(Ryi ; R
y
j ; R
x
 fi;jg) = y which contradicts what we obtained above.
This ends the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 4 Let n  3. If for some i 2 N and some Ryi 2 Ryi , f(Ryi ; Rx i) = x
then f(RyC ; R
x
 C) = x for any C, ? $ C $ N .
Proof of Claim 4 Suppose, to get a contradiction, that for some C, ? $
C $ N; f(RyC ; Rx C) = y. Clearly, C 6= fig. Note also that C can not be
a singleton (otherwise, if C = fjg, j 6= i, we would get a contradiction by
Claim 3). Thus, #C > 1. Note also that f(Ryk; R
x
 k) = x for any k 2 N
(otherwise, f(Ryk; R
x
 k) = y, by Claim 4, f(R
y
i ; R
x
 i) = y which is not the
case). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can suppose that i 2 C. We
distinguish two subcases:
Subcase 1 Let f(Ryi ; R
xy
Cnfig; R
x
 C) = x. Note that X(R
y
i ; R
xy
Cnfig; R
x
 C) =
X(RyC ; R
x
 C) and ? 6= Y (Ryi ; RxyCnfig; Rx C) $ Y (RyC ; Rx C). Therefore, by xy-
strong monotonicity f(RyC ; R
x
 C) = x, which is a contradiction.
Subcase 2 Let f(Ryi ; R
xy
Cnfig; R
x
 C) = y. Note that Y (R
y
i ; R
xy
Cnfig; R
x
 C) =
Y (Ryi ; R
x
 i) and ? 6= X(Ryi ; RxyCnfig; Rx C) $ X(Ryi ; Rx i). Therefore, by xy-
strong monotonicity, f(Ryi ; R
x
 i) = y, which is a contradiction. This ends the
proof of Claim 4.
Proof of Step 3:
First, by Claim 1, f(R) = x for any R such that xRiy for any i 2 N and
xPjy for some j 2 N and f(R) = y for any R such that yRix for any i 2 N
and yPjx for some j 2 N . Second, f(R) can be any outcome for any R where
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all agents are indi¤erent. Third, the argument di¤ers depending on n being
two or higher.
If n = 2, suppose rst that f is such that for some prole (Ry1; R
x
2), where
Ry1 2 Ry1 and Rx2 2 Rx2 , f(Ry1; Rx2) = y and for some prole (Ry2; Rx1), where
Ry2 2 Ry2 and Rx1 2 Rx1 , f(Ry2; Rx1) = y. By Claim 2, for any Ry1 2 Ry1 and
Rx2 2 Rx2 , f(Ry1; R2) = y and f(Ry2; R1) = y for any R2 2 R2 and R1 2 R.
Thus, f can be rewritten as a veto rule for x.
Second, suppose that for some prole (Ry2; R
x
1), where R
y
2 2 Ry2 and Rx1 2 Rx1 ,
f(Ry2; R
x
1) = y and for any prole (R
y
1; R
x
2), where R
y
1 2 Ry1 and Rx2 2 Rx2 ,
f(Ry1; R
x
2) = x. By Claim 2, for any R
y
2 2 Ry2; f(Ry2; R1) = y and for any
R1 2 R1. Note that this rule f can be rewritten as a serial dictator with
order 2  1.
Third, suppose that for some prole (Ry1; R
x
2), where R
y
1 2 Ry1 and Rx2 2 Rx2 ,
f(Ry1; R
x
2) = y and for any prole (R
y
2; R
x
1), where R
y
2 2 Ry2 and Rx1 2 Rx1 ,
f(Ry2; R
x
1) = x. By Claim 2, for any R
y
1 2 Ry1; f(Ry1; R2) = y and for any
R2 2 R2. Note that this rule f can be rewritten as a serial dictator with
order 1  2.
Finally, suppose that for any prole (Ry2; R
x
1), where R
y
2 2 Ry2 and Rx1 2 Rx1 ,
f(Ry2; R
x
1) = x and for any prole (R
y
1; R
x
2), where R
y
1 2 Ry1 and Rx2 2 Rx2 ,
f(Ry1; R
x
2) = x. By the counterpart of Claim 2, for any R
y
2 2 Ry2; f(Ry2; R1) =
x for any R1 2 R1; and for any Ry1 2 Ry1; f(Ry1; R2) = x for any R2 2 R2.
Thus, f can be rewritten as a veto rule for y.
If n  3, suppose rst that f is such that for some prole (Ryi ; Rx i), where
Ryi 2 Ryi and Rxj 2 Rxj for any j 2 Nnfig, f(Ryi ; Rx i) = y. Then, by
Claims 2 and 3, f(Ryk; R k) = y for any k; any Rk 2 Ryk; and any Rj 2 Rj;
j 2 Nnfkg. That is, the outcome will be y for any prole where there is one
agent that strictly supports y over x. Thus, f is a veto rule for x.
Let now suppose that f is such that for all proles (Ryi ; R
x
 i), where R
y
i 2 Ryi
and Rxj 2 Rxj for any j 2 Nnfig, f(Ryi ; Rx i) = x. Then, by Claim 4 and the
counterparts of Claims 2 and 3, the outcome will be x for any prole where
there is one agent that strictly supports x over y. Thus, f is a veto rule for
y.
This ends proof of Step 3, and hence the proof of Theorems 2, 3, and 4.
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5 Final Remarks
In this paper we have provided di¤erent denitions of strategy-proofness in
front of possible manipulations by groups, and several characterizations of
rules satisfying these properties when their range is restricted to cover two
alternatives.
We feel that, when attainable, non-manipulability by groups (in its di¤er-
ent forms) is an attractive property, since in many contexts di¤erent agents
can be expected to explore the possibility of beneting from joint actions, in
addition to individual ones. Early authors on the issue of strategy-proofness
did indeed refer to the interest of avoiding such joint strategic behavior (Pat-
tanaik, 1978, Dasgupta, Hammond, andMaskin, 1979, Peleg, 1984 and 2002).
True, in many domains, and for functions with non-binary ranges, it may be
excessive to ask for these properties. But not always! For interesting cases
when they may be fullled because of domain restrictions, see Moulin (1999),
Pápai (2000), Barberà and Jackson (1995). In fact, our paper contemplates
another case where joint manipulations can be avoided, this time because
the ranges of our functions are restricted.
We have allowed for agents to have preferences over other alternatives
that are not in the range, and been careful in following up the implications
of that extension in the domains of the rules. This is in contrast with the
work of authors who assume that only two alternatives are available when
the range consists of two of them. We insist in the di¤erence, because we
want to emphasize that the choice to restrict the range is indeed a possible
tool for the mechanism designer, even when more than two choices are in
principle socially available.
We have also looked for characterizations that are essentially independent
of the characteristics of the domains of denition of the rules. This is because
the sets of rules satisfying our di¤erent versions of non-manipulability by
groups could in principle be varying as the domains of denition change
from one application to another. By selecting properties that are necessary
and su¢ cient for our conditions to be satised, we go to the essentials of the
question. And, when needed, our qualications on the minimal requirements
on domains for our results to hold are made explicit at each point.
We have also insisted in examining the role of individuals who are in-
di¤erent between the alternatives in the range (but not identical in other
respects). The presence of indi¤erences is always a source of problems in
social choice, and it also complicates and enriches our analysis here.
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We leave it to the interested reader to examine how our analysis would
be simplied (and sometimes reduced to previously existing results) when
only two alternatives are present at all, and/or when indi¤erences among
alternatives are ruled out.
Let us also mention that we have concentrated on the notions of weak and
strong group strategy-proofness, The intermediate notion of group strategy-
proofness has been proven to be equivalent to the strong version under mild
domain assumptions, but not for the particular case of two alternatives only.
Characterizations of rules satisfying the intermediate property in this partic-
ular case are left as an open problem.
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